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The Employer-Employee Relationship
Under the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act
WEX S. MALONE*
The scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act is limited to
the rights and duties that obtain between employer and employee.'
It follows that the existence of the employer-employee relationship
is an essential requisite to any action arising under the Act. Although
Section 6 allows recovery by an employee of an independent con-
tractor directly against the latter's principal (in which case the em-
ployment relationship will not exist between the litigating parties)
yet it is essential that the claimant establish that he was the employee
of the intermediate contractor, and thus the employment relation-
ship is an indispensable matter to be proved under this procedure
as well.
Matters relative to the employer-employee relation fall into two
groups for purposes of discussion: First, the essentials of the relation-
ship, which includes the means by which it is brought into being,
its beginning, duration and ending. Since the parties must not
merely become employer and employee respectively, but must like-
wise agree, expressly or impliedly, to subject themselves to the terms
of the Act, the election to bring the employment under the com-
pensation principle may appropriately be considered here.
Second, the relation between employer and employee must be
distinguished from other relationships which are similar to it, but
which are outside the protection of the Act. These include the
relation of seller and buyer, principal and contractor and lessor and
lessee. However, limitations of space preclude an adequate consid-
eration of this phase of the inquiry, and the present article is limited
arbitrarily to the first group of problems suggested above.
.Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended,
§ 1(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391(1)], provides that it shall apply to "every
person in the service of the State" et cetera, and "for such employer and
employee" the payment of compensation under the terms of the Act shall be
exclusive. Section 1(2) covers "every person performing services arising out of
and incidental to his employment in" certain designated hazardous businesses.
(Italics supplied.)
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THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
A person may become an employee within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act if he is performing a service for
another with the latter's consent and subject to his control or direc-
tion. No formal contract between the two is necessary, and there
need be no specific agreement as to how much is to be done or how
long the arrangement shall continue. Nor is it required that the
amount or terms of payment be settled, so long as the circumstances
fairly indicate that the services were not intended as a gratuity and
both parties understood that payment was to be made therefor.2
The relationship, however, rests on contract, and an offer by the
employer that contemplates an acceptance brought to the attention
of the offeror cannot, without more ado, give rise to the employer-
employee relation.? Similarly, one person cannot make himself the
employee of another merely by undertaking to do the latter's work
without his knowledge,4 and in such case it is not sufficient that the
claimant honestly believed he was an employee.' Consent, however,
may be implied where the employer, or even his authorized agent,
knew that the work was being done, and failed to object when he
had an opportunity to do so.6
In view of the loose and informal practices that regularly prevail
in the making of employments the courts have adopted a liberal
attitude toward the existence of the relationship within the meaning
of the Act. Here, as elsewhere in the administration of workmen's
compensation, the courts have expressed themselves as favoring a
liberal construction toward those who are to be benefited by the Act.
This attitude is well illustrated by Kilpatrick v. Triangle Drilling
Company.' In that case the defendant employer left word at plain-
tiff's residence that he wanted either the plaintiff or the latter's son
to work for him. According to the arrangement it was immaterial
2. See Spanja v. Thibodeaux Boiler Works, 33 So. (2d) 146, 149 (La. App.
[Orl.] 1948). In view of the fact that the rate of compensation is com-
puted in terms of the weekly wage received at the time of injury (Workmen's
Compensation Law, La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939)§ 4398] it is clear that no claim can be allowed with reference to gratuitous
labor.
3. Young v. Petty Stave & Lbr. Co., 7 La. App. 90 (2nd cir. 1927).
4. Gentry v. Peterson, 19 So. (2d) 623 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1944).
5. Noble v. Southland Lbr. Co., Inc., 4 La. App. 281 (2nd cir. 1926) (plain-
tiff, believing he had been employed for carpentry work, reported for duty. He
was told to wait, while employer sought to find a place for him on the job.
During the interval he was struck 'by falling timber).
6. Gentry v. Peterson, 19 So. (2d) 623, 624 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1944).
7. 146 So. 758 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1983).
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which person served, so long as the job was done; and one or the
other of the two, indiscriminately, worked from time to time,
although the name of the son only was carried on the defendant's
payroll. When the father was injured during the course of his work,
the court of appeal observed that the case presents the unusual situa-
tion of two men holding one job, but it allowed compensation.8
EFFECT OF FRAUD
Even though the employment was secured through fraudulent
misrepresentation by the employee and the contract is therefore ren-
dered voidable, this does not prevent the employer-employee relation-
ship from arising so as to create the right to compensation. In
Pick v. Toye Brothers Auto & Taxicab Company' the applicant, a
negro, presented himself for a position as taxi driver, wearing a
municipal license badge stolen from a third person. He further
misrepresented both his race and his age and he used an assumed
name. Despite the fact that the subject of at least two of his false
statements (age and license) related directly to the safety conditions
of the position of taxi driver, his parents were awarded compensa-
tion when he was killed during the course of employment in an
accident due largely to his own carelessness.
If the matter that the employee misrepresented was not a factor
in bringing about the accident, it is clear that he should not be
deprived of his right to compensation;1" and even where, as in the
Pick case, the misrepresentation directly affected the conditions of
safety, it seems that the same result should follow; for the employer's
liability to pay compensation is not limited to responsibility merely
for the risks he could have avoided. If the employer were permitted
to litigate the intricacies of the bargaining that led to the employ-
ment, a new uncertainty would be introduced and the now dis-
credited notion that the employee must be free from fault would,
to that extent, be resurrected.
PROOF OF THE EMPLOYMENT
The claimant must prove by the preponderance of evidence that
he was an employee of the defendant at the time of his injury.'
8. Cf. Litton v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, 195 So. 638 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1940)(fact that employee engaged in hauling was privileged to obtain assistance from
his son did not prevent his being an employee against defendant's contention
that he was an independent contractor).
9. 127 So. 59 (La. App. [Orl.] 1980), noted in (1930) 5 Tulane L. Rev. 187.
10. But see Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Rock, 279 U. S. 410, 49
S. Ct. 363, 73 L. Ed. 766 (1929), noted in (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 181.
11. See Light v. Louisiana Shows Co., Inc., 170 So. 505 (La. App. 1st cir.
1936). In Thomas v. Berwick Ice & Fuel Co., 145 So. 3846, 385 (Ia. App. 1st cir.
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The situations in which this burden may be difficult to sustain fall
generally into two groups. First are the cases where it may be clear
that the complainant was working for someone, but informal usages.
and loose practices make it difficult to determine who is the em-
ployer. This may arise where the employment is made through
the agency of an intermediary who is himself an employee, but
who nevertheless directs the work of those under him, pays their
wages from his own paycheck, and in effect may be the only
,superior with whom the sub-employee has any personal contact. If
this intermediary works indiscriminately for several employers
under similar arrangements, the problem of proof for the sub-
employee may be a difficult one.'" Similarly one member of an
employing concern may be engaged in similar work on his own
account, and the employee may not know whether he is under con-
tract with the firm or with the individual member. This dilemma
is heightened when, as is often the case, payroll practices between
the firm and the individual are informal or confused. " In general,
the problem of proof is likely to give trouble whenever the employ-
ment is sporadic, and, although it may be admitted that the claimant
had worked on occasions for the defendant, it is denied that he was
so employed at the time of the accident. 4
1933), the court, in referring to the proof necessary to establish the employment,.
remarked: "In a case of this character . . . , plantiff must prove his demand
with legal certainty. If this doctrine of liberal interpretation was to apply to the
evidence required, it might be woven and expanded into a mantle of charity to
cover many sins of commission and omission."
12. Williams v. Warmsley, 138 So. 149 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1931), with which.
compare Langlinais v. National Casualty Co., 11 So. (2d) 75 (La. App. 1st cir.
1942). See also Owers v. McElveen, 145 So. 392 (La. App. 1st cir. 1933) (plain-
tiff failed to prove intermediary employee had power to hire for defendant). Cf..
Hughes v. Lyon Lumber Co., 143 So. 520 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932); Fletcher v.
Texas Co., 124 So. 636 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1929).
13. Mahaffey v. Mill Crek Lbr. Co., 147 So. 834 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1933);.
Light v. Louisiana Shows Co., Inc., 170 So. 505 (La. App. 1st cir. 1936).
14. See Felts v. Singletary, 143 So. 68 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932); Franklin v.
Louisiana Central Lbr. Co., 154 So. 373 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1934); Jarrow v..
Sabrier, 5 La. App. 288 (Orl. App. 1926); Bonner v. Louisiana Cent. Lbr. Co.,
160 So. 325 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1935).
Of particular interest in this connection is Lognion v. Lake Charles Steve-
dores, Inc., 172 439 (La. App. 1st cir. 1937). Plaintiff, a stevedore, was period--
ically hired by defendant for unloading operations through the agency of a union.
On the occasion in question a call had been issued for a loading employment
through the union. Sometimes before the scheduled arrival of the vessel a dispute-
arose between this union and a rival organization and it became apparent that
hostilities might break out. Apparently the sympathies of defendant employer
were with the union of which plaintiff was a member, and defendant consented
to plaintiff's storing firearms on the premises under union orders, presumably
for the purpose both of protecting defendant's property and furthering the
union's cause. Plaintiff was injured by the accidental discharge of a weapon.
The court of appeal held that the employer-employee relationship had not taken,
effect, and compensation was denied. Compare Ledoux v. Fleming, 188 La. 52,
175 So. 747 (1937).
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The fact that the injury was reported to the insurer, and even
that compensation was paid for a short period, is not necessarily
conclusive proof of the existence of the employment when it is
shown that the entry was made by mistake and the facts otherwise
indicate that the relationship did not exist. 5 However, the fact
that such a report was made is cogent evidence of hiring in an
otherwise doubtful situation. 6
Second, the complainant may be able to show that he performed
odd jobs for the defendant and was frequently present at the scene
of the latter's operations, and yet may be unable to establish an
understanding that he was to be paid or that he was subject to the
defendants control. This is the case of the hanger-on. It is illustrated
in Suter v. Rednour.7 The complainant was a young man of
itinerant habits who frequented defendant's establishment, a ware-
house. He was allowed to sleep on the premises and performed odd
jobs on occasion for defendant and others. He was injured on
defendant's truck en route to Florida. It was shown that complain-
ant made the trip for his own purposes, although he may have
assisted the driver occasionally. Compensation was refused. Simi-
larly, in Harris v. Sun Indemnity Company of New York"8 com-
plainant was given a lift in defendant's poultry truck. Although
he assisted with the driving, the court held that he was not an
employee.
CASUAL EMPLOYEES
The term "casual employment" has been so variously defined
under the different workmen's compensation laws that it must be
regarded as a word of art whose meaning is to be derived from the
particular statute under consideration. The accepted dictionary treat-
ment of the term defines it as "happening without design and unex-
pectedly, coming without regularity, occasional." When so viewed,
the casualness of the employment relates to its unstable duration
in point of time. Most compensation acts, however, do not exclude
an employment merely because of its uncertainty in this respect so
long as it is a part of the employer's regular business. It is generally
required that the employment be both temporary in duration and
also divorced from the regular calling of the employer if it is to
15. Langlinais v. National Casualty Co., 11 So. (2d) 75 (La. App. 1st cir.
1942).
16. Mahaffey v. Mill Creek Lbr. Co., 147 So. 834 (La. App. 2nd dir. i933).
17. 161 So. 330 (La. App. [Orl.] 1935).
18. 28 So. (2d) 403 (La. App. [Orl.] 1946).
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escape coverage.1" Consequently the term "casual" as designating
an employment excluded from the statutes has come to signify both
the notion of irregularity of duration and the notion of being sepa-
rate from the regular business of the employer.
The statutes of Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington make no mention of
casual employment." The Louisiana Act, like most of these above,
applies only to employments in the course of the employer's trade,
business or occupation.2 If, however, the work of the employee is
a part of the employer's regular business, the employment is covered
under our Act despite the informality of the contractual arrange-
ment and the short duration of the period of employment. The
term, "casual employment," insofar as it has been employed by our
courts, is used in connection with the temporary character of the
relationship and, as such, casual employments have been held ex-
pressly to fall within the protection of the statute:
"There is no contention that [plaintiff] was a casual employee.
However, if such a contention were advanced, it appears that
our Workmen's Compensation Statute covers casual employ-
ment."
There are numerous reported cases in which the courts have
without comment allowed compensation even though the employ-
ment was limited to a few days,2" or even, as in one case, 4 to several
hours. In these instances it may be difficult to determine the weekly
rate of compensation, but this does not prevent the employment
relationship from existing so as to warrant the allowance of
compensation.
19. 2 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (8 ed. 1942) § 279.
20. Ibid.
21. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended,
§ 1, par. 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4,391(2)].
22. Langley v. Findley, 207 La. 807, 815, 21 So.(2d) 229, 281 (1944). "But
in this state casual employees are not excluded from the benefits of the Com-
pensation Law, and we are aware of no decision of our courts which has denied
recovery upon the giound that the employment was casual and temporary."
Westerfield, J., in Ranson-Rooney v. Overseas Ry., Inc., 134 So. 765, 769 (La.
App. [Or].] 1931), reversed on other grounds 178 La. 183, 136 So. 486 (1931).
23. King v. American Tank & Equipment Corp., 144 So. 283 (LA. App. 2nd
cir. 1932) (employment for a single unloading operation, not to exceed three
days).
24. Hayes v. Barras, 6 So. (2d) 66 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1941) (employment
for part of an afternoon). Compare Spanja v. Thibodeaux Boiler Works, Inc.,
2 So. (2d) 668 (La. App. [Orl.] 1941) (plaintiff regularly employed by another,
became defendant's employee pro hac vico by momentarily assisting latter's load-
ing operations, and recovery limited to compensation).
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EMPLOYMENT THROUGH AGENTS-SUB-EMPLOYMENT
Like any other contractual arrangement, the agreement to em-
ploy may be made through the employer's agent, and, if there is
authority to employ, the principal may thereby be made liable for
compensation. This is true whether the agency is a labor organiza-
tion," another workman," or an outsider.
Of course the agent must be duly authorized to employ on his
master's behalf, and one worker who secures another to assist him
does not thereby create the relation of employer and employee be-
tween his helper and his employer." Generally, a common laborer-
is not clothed with ostensible authority to create an employment on
his master's behalf." If, however, the employer, having full knowl-
edge of the fact, allows the sub-employee to continue working for
him, he may be estopped to deny any absence of authority to hire.29
Likewise, an employer who has placed his work in the hands of
another and has vested him with apparent general authority to hire
helpers, cannot assert secret limitations on the authority granted? °
Usually the employing agent serves only to create a contractual
obligation between the employer and the employee, so that the
former assumes control of the latter's work and becomes liable for
the payment of his wages, in which case the agent does not subject
himself to liability for compensation."' In some types of work,
however, there prevails the practice of allowing one employee to
hire others as his helpers, and the intermediate employee determines
the number of persons he will hire, personally supervises their work,
and pays their wages himself. This practice is common with the
hiring of haulers, particularly in connection with lumbering opera-
tions. It would be expected that an intermediary who enjoys such
an extensive latitude with reference to those who assist him would
be looked upon as an enterpriser and would have the status of an
25. Ledoux v. Fleming, 188 La. 52, 175 So. 747 (1939).
26. Shipp v. Bordelon, 152 La. 795, 94 So. 399 (1922); Kagle v. Tudor,
3 La. App. 435 (2nd cir. 1925); Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co., 8 La. App. 160
(2nd cir. 1927); Davis v. Buckley, 153 So. 303 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1934); James
v. Dear & Johnson, 172 So. 25 (La. App. 1st cir. 1937).
27. Owers v. McElveen, 145 So. 392 (La. App. 1st cir. 1933). See Harris
v. Sun Indemnity Co. of N. Y., 28 So. (2d) 403 (La. App. [Orl.] 1946).
28. See Harville v. Eicher-Woodland Lbr. Co., 3 La. App. 406, 410 (2nd
cir. 1926).
29. See Davis v. Buckley, 153 So. 303 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1934).
30. Kagle v. Tudor, 3 La. App. 435 (2nd cir. 1925).
31. Pratt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 10 So. (2d) 252 (La. App. 2nd cir.
1942) (agent not personally liable even though he paid employee's wages and
was reimbursed by principal); Lay v. Pugh, 119 So. 456 (La. App. 1st cir. 1928).
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independent contractor. However, such is not necessarily the case.
Frequently intermediaries of this kind are classified as employees,
despite the fact that they operate a small organizational unit of their
own and maintain a payroll for those under them.32
What is the status of a sub-employee under such an arrange-
ment? Is he to be regarded as serving in the employment of the
intermediary, of the ultimate employer, or both? If the interme-
diary were regarded as an independent contractor, those persons who
are employed by him could recover compensation either from him
or from the ultimate principal as they may elect. 3 Insofar as the
ultimate employer is concerned, there is certainly no reason why
he should not be liable to compensate for injury to those who are
his sub-employees and subject finally to his control, at least to the
extent that he would be liable to the employees of an independent
contractor. Moreover, it appears that those who serve under an
intermediate employee should be regarded as direct employees of
the ultimate master. Although in practice they are subject to the
control of the intermediate employee, yet this is- usually the case
whenever an employer exercises his supervision through the agency
of a supervisor, overseer or other superior servant. The control
exercised by the latter is only the control of the principal. The fact
that the wages are paid by the intermediary does not affect the
relationship, since there is no requirement that the master be under
a personal obligation to pay the servant.3 4 Accordingly the ultimate
employer has been held liable in compensation to sub-employees
without reference to Section 6 of the Act, despite the fact that only
the intermediate employee was obligated for the payment of the
wages,35 or that the ultimate employer paid the wages directly but
under an agreement that a corresponding amount would be de-
ducted from the wages of the intermediary."
In view of the fact that the intermediary is himself an employee
and his control over the sub-employee is exercised entirely on behalf
of the ultimate employer, it follows that he should not be liable for
compensation to an injured sub-employee. Nor should he be obliged
32. See, for example, Nesmith v. Reich Bros., 203 La. 928, 14 So. (2d) 767
(1943), affirming 14 So. (2d) 325 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1942) (truck-owner and
hauler employed two drivers); Collins v. Smith, 13 So. (2d) 72 (La. App. 2nd
cir. 1943) (truck-owner and hauler employed two helpers).
33. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4396].
34. 1 A. L. I., Restatement of Agency (1933) § 225.
35. James v. Dear & Johnson, Inc., 172 So. 25 (La. App. 1st cir. 1937);
McKay v. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co., 189 So. 508 (La. App. 1st cir. 1939).
36. Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co., 8 La. App. 160 (2nd cir. 1927).
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to indemnify the ultimate employer who has paid compensation
to the sub-employee.3 7 In this respect the intermediate 'employee
differs from the independent contractor, who represents a distinct
enterprise, and who must finally bear the compensation costs under
Section 6.
An interesting variation of the general problem of employment
through an agent arises in connection with public work done under
the auspices of a federal relief agency. In these cases both the public
body receiving the benefit of the labor, and the relief agency, main-
tain some degree of control over the employee. Each exercises control
for a different purpose and the supervision is coordinated through
informal arrangements. The public body is interested in the accom-
plishment of the construction work undertaken for its benefit, while
the relief agency (which pays the wage) maintains supervision over
the employee for the purpose of insuring that the conditions laid
down for its own operation are complied with and that the federal
public purpose to which the agency is dedicated is fulfilled. In
view of the fact that the personal details are more directly under
the authority of the relief agency than of the public body, and that
the former has the power to hire and fire, it has been held that the
public body is not the direct employer, and the allowance of com-
pensation must depend upon the provisions of Section 63
BORROWED EMPLOYEE
One employer may lend his employee (sometimes together with
a truck or other piece of equipment) to another. If the employee
is injured while performing the work of the borrower, who is re-
sponsible for compensation? Since the purpose of the lending
arrangement is to subject the employee to the control of the bor-
rowing employer, it generally follows that the latter alone is liable to
pay compensation, despite the fact that the lender pays the wages of
the employee, and retains the right to dismiss him or substitute
another in his place.39 However, it is now generally conceded that
87. The non-liability of the intermediate employee appears to have been
recognized by the federal district court in Alphonzo v. American Iron & Machine
Wks. Co., 39 F. Supp. 934 (E. D. La. 1941). However, an early opinion of the
Louisiana court of appeal suggests the contrary. Jones v. Louisiana Oil Refining
Corp., 3 La. App. 85 (2nd cir. 1925).
38. Todaro v. City of Shreveport, 170 So. 856 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1986);
Washington v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 180 So. 199 (La. App.
[Orl.] 1938).
39. Spanja v. Thibodeaux Boiler Works, 33 So. (2d) 1465 (La. App. [Orl.]
1948); Sadler v. May Bros., Inc., 185 So. 81 (La. App. 1st dir. 1938). See also
Robinson v. Atkinson, 198 La. 238, 3 So. (2d) 604, (1941), reversing Robinson v.
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for some purposes the claimant may still be regarded as being in the
employment of the lender, as where, for instance, he is injured while
repairing or maintaining a piece of equipment that was entrusted to
him by the lender.4" Likewise, if the equipment is highly complex
or specialized, so that the borrower would not likely direct the
method of operation, the employee may be regarded as subject to the
control of the lender in operating it.41
A lending arrangement is in effect a three party agreement.
This means that not only must there be an understanding between
lender and borrower, but the employee, as well, must have consented
to the change of masters. For example, a construction laborer was
ordered by the company employing him to perform work on the
private property of one of the company's officers under an arrange-
ment whereby the company continued to be responsible for his
wages, but was to be reimbursed by the officer. This was without
the knowledge of the employee, who reasonably believed that he
was doing company work subject to its orders. Under these circum-
stances the company was not allowed to deny that the claimant, who
was injured during this assignment, was its employee."
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the lending employer
from the independent contractor. This distinction is not of much
importance in determining the liability of the principal or the bor-
rowing employer (as the case may be) since he can be made liable
as a principal under Section 6 of the Act or as a direct employer
under Section 1. Nevertheless,- the distinction becomes important
when it is sought to maintain a call in warranty against the lender
or contractor. If the latter is designated a contractor, he can be
called upon to indemnify the principal against loss under Section 6.
If, on the other hand, he is a mere lending employer who has relin-
quished control over the employee, he is free from further liability.
Generally speaking, the lending employer has no interest in the
result to be accomplished by the borrower through the use of the
borrowed employee. His sole undertaking is to make the employee
available for the borrower's work, and to that purpose he relin-
quishes control of his servant. The independent contractor, on the
other hand, specifically agrees to become responsible for an end
Atkinson, 8 So. (2d) 600 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1941). See generally, Smith, Scope
of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1222.
40. 1 A. L. I., Restatement of Agency (1983) § 227, Comment c.
41. Ibid., but cf. Robinson v. Atkinson, 198 La. 238, 3 So. (2d) 604 (1941),
reversing Robinson v. Atkinson, 8 So. (2d) 600 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1941).
42. McEachern v. Pine Wood Lbr. Co., Ltd., 5 La. App. 665 (2nd cir. 1927).
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result. Usually he alone determines the means to be used in fulfill-
ing the contract, fixes the number of employees to be assigned to the
task, and controls them himself. Sometimes, however, the task
undertaken by the independent contractor may be relatively simple
and may be scheduled for performance at a distance from the con-
tractor under circumstances where the principal is expected to exer-
cise a general'supervision and, in effect, to direct the doing of the
work. In such cases the role of independent contractor may be
difficult to distinguish from that of a lending employer. In Lindsey
v. White43 the Ray Drilling Company entered into a contract
whereby White undertook to haul fuel oil for use in Ray's drilling
operations in Mississippi. It was understood that to accomplish this
purpose a driver and truck would be furnished for four dollars per
hour, and that Ray would direct the driver as to where the oil should
be loaded and delivered. The employee, Lindsey, met with an acci-
dent while performing his duties under this arrangement. The court
of appeal found that Ray's liability was that of a principal under
Section 6, and that Ray was entitled to indemnity from White, who
was held to be an independent contractor.
On the other hand, in Sadler v. May Brothers, Incorporated,"'
the defendant hired a truck and a driver, the plaintiff Sadler, from
Wilson for hauling logs. After Sadler had worked under this ar-
rangement for several months, he was injured and instituted his
suit for compensation against defendant, who made a call in war-
ranty on Wilson as an independent contractor. The court held,
however, that Wilson was a mere'lending employer and hence he
was not obliged to indemnify May Brothers.
It is obvious that the lending employer is not to be distinguished
from the independent contractor solely on the basis of the control
exercised in each instance. It is obvious from the two cases above
that there was little difference in the extent of control exercised by
White and by Wilson. The difference lies primarily in the scope
of the undertaking of the party who is charged as independent con-
tractor. This, in turn, is gathered from the contract expressly or by
implication, from the nature of the work to be done,"5 the duration
- 43. 22 So. (2d) 689 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1945).
44. 185 So. 81 (La. App. 1st cir. 1938).
45. If the scope of the work to be done is defined within fairly narrow
limits, thia is a factor indicating that the arrangement is one between principal
and independent contractor. If, on the other hand, the borrower is free to put
the employee to such tasks as he may choose, a borrowing arrangement is
indicated. Furthermore if the work to be done is of a highly specialized 'nature
which the person providing the services undertakes regularly for others, he is
likely to be regarded as an independent contractor, rather than a lender.
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of time for its completion," and the relationship between the work
done and the general business of the principal or borrowing em-
ployer." In the Lindsey case it was shown that the drilling company
regularly let out its hauling work, which was not an integral part
of its business, to others. Furthermore, the complainant's duties
were confined to the hauling of a particular commodity within
fairly circumscribed limits, and the directions to be given by the
company were no more extensive than the nature of the contract
required.
Even if it is found that the person who furnishes the services
of his employee to another is an independent contractor, the bor-
rowed employee problem may still arise. If the person for whom
the services are provided requests the employee to perform additional
duties not contemplated by the former's agreement with the inde-
pendent contractor, the employee, by acquiescing, may abandon for
the time his general employment and become the temporary em-
ployee of the new master. In this instance he will be entitled to
compensation from the latter if he is injured during the departure,48
and by the same token he will have relinquished his claims for
compensation against his general employer, the independent con-
tractor. 9
In such cases it is important to determine when the performance
of the additional requested work operates as a departure from the
original contract. Strictly speaking, any deviation whatever from
the scope of the agreement between the principal and contractor
would have this effect. However, it is common knowledge that
minor enlargements of the contract which contemplate the same
general type of work are frequently made without the advance
personal consent of the contractor, who is generally agreeable there-
46. In the usual independent contractor situation the contractor specifies
a time when he will complete the task he undertakes. Work for lengthy indeter-
minate periods is not usually of this nature.
47. The importance of the relationship between the work being done by the
borrowed employee and the general business of the borrower is stressed in Smith,
Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev.
1222, 1233.
48. A similar situation arises where an ultimate employer gives an inter-
mediate employee the privilege of hiring sub-employees for a designated type of
work, and the ultimate employer thenxdirectly enlists the services of such sub-
employees for a type of work different from that contemplated by the
sub-employment contract. See Alphonso v. American Iron & Machine Work
Co., 39 F. Supp. 934 (E. D. La. 1941).
49. In such case it is obvious that the lending employer cannot be held liable
for compensation in solido with the borrowing employer, since the employee
is not subject to the control of both parties. Spanja v. Thibodeaux Boiler Works,
33 So. (2d) 146 (La. App. [OrI.] 1938).
[Vol. VIII
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
to, since these enlargements increase the value of his contract or
maintain the goodwill of the principal. If the effect of such a minor
departure were to sever the relation between the contractor and his
employee, the latter would be placed in competition with his
employer.
It follows from the foregoing that a requested departure from
the contract work must be substantial before the employee will be
treated as the servant pro hac vice of the principal. This is well
illustrated in Rooney v. Overseas Railroad, Incorporated.5" Rooney
was employed by the Todd Company, an independent contractor,
and was assigned by them to repair work on a vessel owned by the
Overseas Railroad. During the performance of these duties Rooney
was requested by Overseas to assist in making repairs on a crane
which was installed on the adjacent dock, and he was injured while
so engaged. The supreme court held that at the time of the accident
Rooney remained the employee of Todd, despite the fact that work
on the crane was not contemplated in the contract between Todd
and the Overseas Railroad. Similarly, in Duke v. Dixie Building
Material Company,5 the defendant company employed one Green
to deliver ready mixed concrete for a builder, Moray. By the terms
of the agreement between the latter and defendant the concrete was
to be delivered at a single designated place. However, Green was
requested by Moray to deposit the material at various other places
on the premises. This was held not to be a substantial departure
from the contract with defendant so as to make Green the servant
pro hac vice of Moray.
On the other hand, in Spanja v. Thibodeaux Boiler Works,
Incorporated," plaintiff was employed by the Texas Company to
transport material and equipment by boat at such times and places
as may be directed by his employer. The latter had a contract with,
defendant Thibodeaux Boiler Works, under which the boiler works
agreed to repair a steam boiler for the Texas Company and to load
it onto Spanja's barge for delivery. Pursuant to a request by Thibo-
deaux, Spanja assisted in the loading operation and was injured
while so doing. It was held that he had departed from his employ-
ment under Texas and became for the time the servant of Thibo-
deaux. This case is difficult to distinguish from the Rooney case.
The difference, if any, probably lies in the fact that the Texas Com-
50. 173 La. 183, 136 So. 486 (1931), reversing Ranson-Rooney v. Overseas
Ry., Inc., 134 So. 765 (La. App. [Orl.] 1931).
51. 23 So. (2d) 822 (La. App. [Orl.] 1945).
52. 2 So. (2d) 668 (La. App. [Orl.] 1941).
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pany was not performing work as an independent contractor for
the boiler works, but was in fact a principal with reference to the
latter company. Perhaps for this reason the contract between the
two is not to be regarded as being as elastic as though Spanja's
,general employer were an independent contractor. The effect of
the departure was to restrict, rather than to enlarge, the benefit that
Texas would receive under its agreement with Thibodeaux.
SEVERAL EMPLOYERS-PARTNERSHIP EMPLOYMENTS AND
JOINT ENTERPRISES
One employee may divide his time between two or more em-
ployers. If each of these has separate work to be done and each
exercises exclusive control over the employee during the time the
latter is working for him, the employments should be designated
as separate and successive. Under such circumstances the injured
employee is concerned only with the employer for whom he was
working at the time of the accident. The fact that the claimant
did not devote all his time to the work of this employer may be
important in determining the wage upon which compensation is
to be based, but it does not create a joint employment so as to
subject the other employers to liability. Furthermore, the power to
control the doing of the work, rather than liability for wages, is
determinative as to who was employer at the time of the accident."
If, however, the employee is subject to the joint control of
several employers at the same time and for the same work, he is
entitled, if injured, to subject them all to his compensation claim.
The amount for which each employer can be made liable is discussed
in the following paragraphs; but there is no reason why only one
employer should be held to the exclusion of the others.
If the work being done at the time of the accident was in
furtherance of a joint enterprise shared by all employers, so that
each of them had a direct financial interest in the entire job, we
are presented with a case of partnership or joint enterprise liability.
Under these circumstances there is in reality only one employer,
namely the partnership. 4 Each partner controls the work for the
benefit of himself and the other partners as well; and if one em-
ployer only is sued, he can insist that the others be joined and that
liability be imposed first upon the partnership assets, if any." The
53. 1 A. L. I., Restatement of Agency (1938) § 225.
54. Dupre v. Coleman, 148 La. 69, 78 So. 241 (1918).
55. Ibid.
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individual liability of the partners is determined according to Arti-
cles 2872 and 2873 of the Louisiana Civil Code."
It is not necessary that each partner or joint venturer personally
control the work of the injured employee. It is sufficient that they
are engaged in a common enterprise that contemplates the employ-
ment and control of the claimant by one of the interested parties for
the benefit of all. This is illustrated by Robinson v. Younse Lumber
Company." A and B entered into an agreement whereby B under-
took to sever the timber from a tract that A had purchased on credit,
and to haul it to A's mill where it would be cut into lumber and
sold. B was to furnish the equipment and pay the laborers engaged
in his department of the enterprise. He likewise agreed to pay A
a specified fee for each thousand feet cut, to be applied to the pur-
chase price of the timber. For his performance, B was to receive
one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the lumber. It does not
appear that the parties were equally chargeable with the risks of
the undertaking, and the arrangement could not be regarded strictly
as a partnership. Nevertheless, both parties were equally interested
in the outcome of all phases of the venture, and their relationship
could not appropriately be classified as that of principal and con-
tractor. The court of appeal correctly held that both of them were
liable as employers for compensation to the injured claimant who
was employed by B and was engaged exclusively in cutting timber.
If, however, the defendant's interest in the enterprise is merely
that of a creditor or lessor, he will not be regarded as a partner of
his debtor or lessee so as to cause him to be subjected to compensation
claims by the latter's employees. 8  In Burks v. Glenmora Service
Station9 the defendant company entered into an arrangement with
Hall whereby the latter was permitted to occupy a portion of de-
fendant's service station for a repair shop free of rent. Hall agreed
to hire his own helpers and he was to receive the full amount col-
lected for repairs. Defendant's name, however, was deliberately
used in advertisements for repair work, and accounts owed to Hall
were charged to patrons by defendant. The general appearance
56. Taylor' v. Womack, 22 So. (2d) 73 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1945); Langston
v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 38 F. Supp. 136 (W. D. La. 1941). Cf. Robinson v.
Younse Lbr. Co., 8 La. App. 160 (2nd cir. 1927). See also Brasher v. Industrial
Lbr. Co., 165 So. 524 (La. App. 1st cir. 1936).
57. 8 La. App. 160 (2nd cir. 1927).
58. Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 2nd,
cir. 1939) (father of one partner who loaned money to partnership was not
liable for compensation to an employee of the business).
59. 2 La. App. 530 (2nd cir. 1925).
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was that all aspects of the business were under the single control of
defendant. The claimant was hired by Hall as a mechanic with full
knowledge of this arrangement. His claim for compensation against
defendant was dismissed.
Similarly, a distributor of gas and oil leased a service station
to a partnership and the distributor's name was used prominently
on the premises. An injured employee of the partnership was denied
compensation as against the distributor in spite of a provision in
the lease that the lessees would sell the distributor's products accord-
ing to its instructions."° The court found that no instructions had
ever been given, and that the lessees purchased for cash and resold
the products entirely as they saw fit. If, however, the contract of
lease were to specify in some detail that the lessor intended to control
the method of sale and collection so as to indicate an agency despite
the use of lease terminology, the employees of such a lessee-agent
might well be regarded as sub-employees of the lessor and could
claim compensation from him.6
It sometimes happens that two persons who have entirely sepa-
rate interests may procure an employee who will discharge his duties
to both employers in a single operation. For example, A, who has
goods to be carried from one point to another, employs P for the
job. P likewise agrees with another employer, B, to carry his goods
on the same trip. If P, who is conceded to be an employee for this
purpose, is injured while en route, how should the respective lia-
bilities of A and B be determined? Partnership or solidary liability
would obviously be unfair in such a situation, for neither employer
had a full interest in the mission. Nor can the work be separated
so as to charge one employer to the exclusion of the other, as in
the case of separate successive employments discussed above. Obvi-
ously, an arbitrary division must be made, and such is provided by
Section 32 of the Act:
"In case any employee for whose injury or death payments are
due under this act, shall at the time of the injury be employed
and paid jointly by two or more employers subject to the pro-
60. Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 2nd ci-
1939). Cf. Donovan v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 197 So. 320 (La. App. 2nd cir.
1940) (contract with similar provisions did not create an agency; action by third
person in tort).
61. Cf. McCain v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 142 So. 376 (La. App.
2nd cir. 1932); Goff v. Sinclair Refining Co., 162 So. 452 (La. App. 2nd cir.
1935); Monetti v. Standard Oil Co., 195 So. 89 (La. App. [Orl.] 1940). All
the above are suits in tort for negligence causing injury to third persons.
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vision of this act, such employers shall contribute to such pay-
ment in proportion to their several wage liabilities to such
employees. ,,62 (Italics supplied.)
The contention has been made that this provisi6 n applies also
to employments by partners and thus supersedes Articles 2872 and
2873 of the Revised Civil Code. This is obviously not sound, and
it has been rejected by the courts.63 Section 32 contemplates a situa-
tion where each employer has undertaken a separate wage liability,
which is alien to the entire notion of the partnership obligation. It
seems clear that this section is applicable only where there are sepa-
rate employments in the sense that there is no single partnership or
joint enterprise purpose to be served, but where nevertheless it is not
possible to allocate the risk exclusively to one employment or the
other.
In this connection, the case of Hatch v. Kilpatrick,4 decided by
the court of appeal, presents an interesting and somewhat difficult
situation. Kilpatrick and one Haskins created a partnership, pur-
chased a plane and employed Hatch, an aviator, to operate the plane
in carrying passengers-for hire. It was agreed that Hatch would
look to Kilpatrick exclusively for his wages and that he would
devote part of his time as a salesman in Kilpatrick's automobile sales
agency. There was no apportionment of Hatch's salary with refer-
ence to the time spent as salesman and as aviator, although it
appeared that most of the flying took place during the week-ends.
Hatch was killed while carrying passengers for hire under the
personal supervision of the partner, Haskins. Although the court
clearly recognized that Hatch's dependents were entitled to com-
pensation, it granted full recovery against Kilpatrick individually
and dismissed the claim against the partnership (which, of course,
relieved Haskins of responsibility). The court regarded Kilpatrick
individually, and the partnership of Kilpatrick and Haskins as joint
employers, and accordingly it concluded that since the wages were
62. This section continues as follows: ". . . provided, however, that nothing
in this section shall prevent any arrangement between such employers for
different distribution as between themselves of the ultimate burden of such
payments. If one or more, but not all such employers should be subject to this
act, then the liability of such of them as are so subject shall be to pay that
proportion of the entire payments which their proportionate wage liability
bears to the entire wages of the employee; provided, however, that such payment
by such employer subject to this act shall not bar the right of recovery against
any other joint employer."
63. Taylor v. Womack, 22 So. (2d) 78 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1945).
64. 142 So. 202 (La. App. 2nd ir. 1982).
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paid entirely by the individual employer, Kilpatrick, he alone should
be liable for compensation under Section 32, above.
The writer suggests that the court of appeal was in error. The
situation presented was that of two separate successive employments.
There was no joint employment between Kilpatrick and the part-
nership as contemplated by Section 32. Hatch was hired to sell
automobiles as the employee of Kilpatrick individually; but he was
also hired to devote other parts of his time as an aviator employed
by the partnership of Kilpatrick and Haskins and subject to the
orders of either partner. The two employments called for entirely
different acts of service, different times for performance, and sub-
jected Hatch to different sources of control. When Kilpatrick re-
ceived Hatch's services as aviator, it was solely in his capacity as a
member of the partnership, and he had no separate power of control
which was not shared by Haskins. The fact that a single undivided
wage was paid by Kilpatrick alone for all Hatch's services is not
important except as it may be a complicating factor with reference
to the amount of compensation to be awarded. The situation resolves
itself into an employment by a partnership and thus a judgment
against Haskins and Kilpatrick as partners would have been more
appropriate.
ELECTION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE COMPENSATION ACT
Except for employments under the state or its political subdi-
visions,65 the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act becomes
applicable only through the election of both the employer and the
employee.66 The Act provides, however, that in every contract of
employment in businesses affected by the Act, there is an implied
election that the terms of the Act shall apply.67 If either or both
parties wish to exclude compensation, this must be done by express
provision in writing.6" Both parties may agree in the initial contract
65. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 1, par. 1, La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391(1)].
66. Id. at § 3, par. 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §4393(1)).
67. Id. at par. 3. Philps v. Guy Drilling Co., 143 La. 951, 79 So. 549 (1918);
Summers v. Woodward, Wight & Co., Ltd., 142 La. 241, 76 So. 674 (1917); Roy
v. Mutual Rice Mill Co. of La., Inc., 177 La. 883, 149 So. 508 (1933).
The implied election to come under the terms of the act is not negatived by
the fact that the employer may have misrepresented the extent of danger in the
employment. Brooks v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 7 So. (2d) 658 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1942).
The same provision is made for employments in existence at the time the
act took effect. Workmen's Compensation Act, La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended,
§ 3, par. 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4393(2)].
68. Id. at par. 8.
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that the Act shall not apply, or one of them may serve written notice
upon the other prior to the time the contract is to take effect. In
either event the employment is excluded from its inception."
Also, where the contract is covered under the Act by the express
or implied election of the parties, either of them may terminate his
election by giving written notice to the other.7" Where, however,
the application of the Act is rejected by termination of a prior elec-
tion, the termination does not become effective for thirty days after
the notice is served, and any accident that may occur during this
period falls within the coverage of the Act.7 Any such notice by
employer or employee that he elects not to be subject to the pro-
visions of the Act may be waived at any time and the waiver
becomes effective immediately.72
An express exclusion of compensation in a contract of employ-
ment, whether made in the initial contract or by notice of termina-
tion, is operative only during the life of the agreement to which it
relates. In Berry v. Lawton" the employee was hired for seasonal
work under an agreement excluding compensation. After the
termination of his employment he was re-hired for a second season
under a contract that was silent as to the operation of the Act. The
court of appeal held that the original agreement to exclude com-
pensation expired with the first employment and that the re-employ-
ment carried with it an implied election that the Act shall apply.
Presumably, however, mere extensions of an initial contract would
be governed by any express election to which the contract was sub-
69. This was not formerly true under La. Act 20 of 1914 prior to amendment.
This act provided in substance that an express agreement to exclude its provisions
made'in connection with the initial contract of employment should not become
effective until thirty days thereafter. (§ 3, par. 3). In Woodruff v. Producers'
Oil Co., 142 La. 368, 76 So. 803 (1917), the court found that this provision was
in conflict with Paragraph 1 of the same section, which states that the act
shall be elective. Strangely enough, this conflict was resolved by holding that
the terms of the act could not be made applicable to any accident which occurred
within thirty days of the date of hiring. This case was overruled, however, in
Philps v. Guy Drilling Co., 143 La. 951, 79 So. 549 (1918). In the latter case
the court held that in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary it will
be presumed that the provisions of the act shall become effective immediately
upon employment, and that any agreement to the contrary shall not become
effective for thirty days, as provided in Paragraph 3. The act was thereafter
amended so that express initial agreements to exclude the 'act shall become
operative at once. Only terminations of prior express or implied agreements for
coverage are inoperative for thirty days (La. Act 38 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 4393(3)].
70. Id. at par. 4.
71. Ibid. Barry v. Lawton, 147 So. 703 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1933).
72. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended, § 3, par. 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
4393(5)].
73. 147 So. 703 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1933).
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ject, and the same would be true as to later changes in the terms
of the employment so long as it can fairly be implied that a con-
tinuous employment relationship remained in existence.
In view of the fact that the Act operates to the general prospec-
tive advantage of both the employer and employee, it is seldom that
they will choose to exclude its operation by express agreement. How-
ever, in order to further encourage the bringing of employments
within the terms of the Act, the legislature has provided that if the
employee elects to come under the Act, but the employer elects to
exclude its operation, the employee shall enjoy certain strategic ad-
vantages in the event he is forced to institute suit for an accident
which is attributable to his employer's negligence. In such a suit
the employer will be deprived of the defenses of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.74 More
important, perhaps, is the fact that the occurrence of the injury shall
be presumed to have been the direct result of the employer's care-
lessness." Conversely, if the employer elects to cover the employ-
ment under the Act, but the employee serves notice of his intention
to exclude the employment from compensation, the employer has
available to him the usual employer defenses of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.76
There is no provision in the Act as to the consequences of a
mutual election to exclude the operation of the compensation statute,
although it is obvious that an employer who wishes to avoid com-
pensation will probably do so by presenting to the employee a
mutual agreement that the Act shall not control. Presumably, their
respective rights would be regulated as though there were no appli-
cable compensation legislation, which would mean that in the event
of an accident the usual employers' defenses would be available,
and the employee would be obliged to sustain the normal burden
of proof.
MINORS EMPLOYED IN VIOLATION OF LAW
The Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply to employees
of less than the minimum age prescribed by law for the employment
74. La. Act 20 of 1914, §'4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4394).
75. Ibid.
76. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4395]. In view of the
fact that these defenses would be available to the employer in any situation
where the act is not applicable, it appears that the penalty on the employee
in the present instance is inconsequential.
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of minors in the business or trades covered by the Act.77 It has
been held that this exclusion refers only to state statutes such as the
minimum age law and the child labor law, and does not apply to
a person twenty years of age who was employed in violation of a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the issuance of a chauffeur's cer-
tificate to anyone under the age of twenty-one.7"
The provision was doubtless intended for the benefit of children
whose employment is illegal under state law, since the act of em-
ploying such minors is negligence per se on the part of the employer.
Thus recovery of full damages may be had on behalf of the minor
if he is injured while he is illegally employed,79 and the employer
would be deprived of the benefit of the limitations of the compensa-
tion schedule.
In practice, however, the broad exclusion of illegally employed
minors might conceivably result disadvantageously for the very
group whose protection was intended. Not all the provisions mak-
ing the employment of minors illegal are of the type whose violation
gives rise to a conclusive presumption of negligence. For example,
in the case of Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons"° the employer was guilty
of employing plaintiff's son who was between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen years in violation of Section 2 of Act 301 of 1908 as
amended. This act makes such an employment unlawful unless
there has first been secured an employment certificate, which may
be issued by inter alia the superintendent of schools. When the
minor was injured during the performance of his duties, his parents
instituted suit under Article 2315 R.C.C. The supreme court prop-
erly held that there could be no recovery in the absence of proof
that there was negligence in fact on the part of the employer. The
statute, said the court, related in no way to the safety of the work.
It was enacted solely to insure a minimum disturbance of the educa-
tion progress of the minor. The courts have not indicated whether
an employment in violation of this type of statute would be excluded
from the Compensation Act, under the provision referred to.8 '
77. La. Act 20 of 1914, §3, par. 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398(6)]. Ken-
nedy v. Johnson Lumber Co., 33 So. (2d) 558 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1947)(employment of minors under eighteen years in violation of La. Act 210 of
1944 are excluded from compensation coverage).
78. Plick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 169 La. 44, 124 So. 140 (1929),
reversing 120 So. 721 (La. App. [Orl.] 1929).
79. Alexander v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916),
on rehearing. Damages, however, would not be allowed in such an instance to
the parents who knew of the employment, without objecting. Id. at 811.
80. 11 So. (2d) 38 (La. App.'lst cir. 1942).
81. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 3, par. 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4393(6)]. The
pertinent portion of this paragraph reads as follows: ". . . this act shall not
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Furthermore, our court has adopted the minority view that a child
employed in violation of a child labor law may nevertheless be
excluded from recovery in tort by reason of his contributory negli-
gence.82 Here again the group of children whose protection is
sought by the provision of the Act under consideraton may in fact
be penalized thereby, since the contributory negligence of the em-
ployee is no defense in an action for compensation.
MINORS-ELECTION TO COME UNDER THE ACT
Paragraph 6 of Section 3 of the Act states that the right of
election, termination or waiver shall be exercised personally by any
employee who is eighteen years or more of age. If, however, the
employee is under the age of eighteen, his rights in this respect shall
be exercised on his behalf by either his father, mother, tutor, or if
neither of these can be readily gotten to act, then by the court.8"
In the light of Article 376 of the Revised Civil Code our supreme
court has interpreted this porvision as not to include a minor under
eighteen who has been emancipated by marriage.84
It follows that the employment of a minor under eighteen
years of age does not, without more, give rise to an implied election
by the employee that the Act shall control.8" But the parent may
be held to have elected impliedly for the minor.8" This has given
rise to controversy on several occasions where it has been sought to
determine what constitutes an implied election by a parent. If the
hiring takes place without the parent's knowledge and the accident
occurs before the parent has learned of the employment, there can
apply to employees of less than the minimum age prescribed by law for the
employment of minors .... "
82. Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
881 (1909).
83. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 3, par. 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4393(6)].
84. Roy v. Mutual Rice Mill Co. of La., 177 La. 883, 149 So. 508 (1933),
reversing 143 So. 668 (La. App. 1st cir. 1932).
85. Ballard v. Stroube Drug Co., 10 So. (2d) 532 (La. App. 1st cir. 1942).
It would seem too clear for dispute that if such minor employee is not empowered
to elect expressly for compensation he cannot be held to have made an implied
election. See, however, suggestions to the contrary in Parham v. Standard Oil
Co. of La., 275 Fed. 1007 (N. D. Miss. 1921) and Ross v. Cockran & Franklin
Co., Inc., 122 So. 141 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1929). In the Parham case, however,
this notion was discountenanced by the circuit court of appeals [Standard Oil
Co. of La. v. Parham, 279 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922)], while in the Ross case
the court expressly found that the parents elected for the child.
86. Ballard v. Stroube Drug Co., 19 So. (2d) 593 (La. App. 1st cir. 1944);
Ross v. Cockran & Franklin Co., Inc., 122 So. 141 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1929);
Garcia v. Salmen Brick & Lbr. Co., 151 La. 784, 92 So. 335 (1922).
[Vol. Vill
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
be no implied election by the latter that the Act shall control.8"
Furthermore, after the parent has gained knowledge of an already
existing employment of the minor, he should be allowed a reason-
able period either to enter an objection or to manifest his election
one way or the other. It appears, however, that the parent must act
promptly if he wishes to avoid the presumed election that'the
Compensation Act shall apply. In Ross v. Cockran & Franklin
Company"8 the sixteen year old son of plaintiff was hired by de-
fendant without the knowledge of his parent, who did not learn
of the employment until eight days later. The son was injured two
days thereafter, and the plaintiff sought to recover in tort under
Article 2315. The court held that in view of the fact that the parent
owned an automobile and resided only five miles from the place of
work, his inaction for two days gave rise to an implied election that
the employment should be covered under compensation. Similarly,
it has been held that where the parent knew that the minor proposed
to seek employment by defendant as a delivery boy and later saw
him on defendant's motorcycle (although accompanied by a more
mature employee) and raised no objection thereto, there was an
implied election that the Act should control, although the minor
was injured that same day on his first mission for his employer.8 9
Where the parent has consented to the minor's general employ-
ment in an occupation designated as hazardous under the Act and
has thereby impliedly elected that the Compensation Act shall con-
trol, this election is not terminated by the action of the employer
in assigning new duties to the minor, even though these may be
more hazardous than the duties he had previously performed with
the parent's consent." It would appear, however, that the parent
should be able to restrict expressly the duties to be performed by his
minor child and by so doing to preclude his election from being
made applicable to an unauthorized imposition by the master of
new and more hazardous duties on the minor employee.9 Further-
87. Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Parham, 279 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922);
Ballard v. Stroube Drug Co., 10 So. (2d) 532 (La. App. 1st cir. 1942). Cf.
Bourgeois v. J. W. Crawford Constr. Co., 28 So. (2d) 765 (La. App. 1st
ir. 1947).
88. 122 So. 141 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1929).
89. Ballard v. Stroube Drug Co., 19 So. (2d) 593 (La. App. 1st cir. 1944).
90. Garcia v. Salmen Brick & Lbr. Co., 151 La. 784, 92 So. 335 (1922) (boy
employed to roll wheelbarrow was transferred to help on cars without parents'
consent); Liner v. Riverside Gravel Co., 127 So. 146 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1930)
(boy employed to clean banks of bayou was assigned to work on barge machinery
without parents' consent).
91. See Garcia v. Salmen Brick & Lbr. Co., 151 La. 784, 788, 92 So. 335, 337
(1922).
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more, if the initial duties to which the minor was assigned with the
parent's consent were wholly nonhazardous 2 (even though the
employer's general business may be designated as hazardous under
the Act) no occasion for an initial presumed election would arise.
If, thereafter, the employee is transferred to a hazardous employ-
ment, it would be essential to the application of the Act that the
parent either expressly consent to the change of work, or that knowl-
edge of the minor's new duties be brought home to him and that
his implied election thereto be found.
SAME-ELECTION BY PARENT AFTER ACCIDENT
If the minor under eighteen years of age was employed without
his parent's consent and suffered injury before the parent learned
of the employment, may the latter thereafter elect for the application
of the Act despite the provision of Paragraph (1) of Section 3, which
requires that the election be made prior to the accident? It can be
urged plausibly that the intendment of the Statute is that there be
afforded the parent of the minor a fair opportunity to make the
election prior to the accident, and when this is denied him, as in the
above instance, the privilege still remains despite the literal meaning
of paragraph (1).
Bourgeois v. J. W. Crawford Construction Company" is the
only case in which this problem has been squarely presented to a
Louisiana court. It appeared that a minor under the age of eighteen
was killed before his parent had an opportunity to elect either ex-
pressly or impliedly. The court held that after the minor's death
the parent could not make an election to accept the Act. It indi-
cated, however, that if the minor had survived, the parent might
make a post-accident election by reason of Section 16 of the Act,
which reads as follows:
"Section 16. 1. That in case an injured employe is men-
tally incompetent or a minor or where death results from the
injury, in case any dependent as herein defined is mentally
incompetent or a minor, at the time when any right, privilege
or election accrues to him under this act, his duly qualified
curator or tutor, as the case may be, may, in his behalf, claim
92. Cf. Gray v. Tremont Lbr. Co., 185 So. 314 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1938).
93. 28 So. 765 (La. App. 1st cir. 1947). Cf. Parham v. Standard Oil Co. of
La., 279 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922), where the parent sought to recover in
tort under Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870, after the death of the child. The
court held that since no election had been made prior to accident, the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not apply and the tort suit was therefore permissible.
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and exercise such right, privilege or election, and no limitation
of time, in this act provided for, shall run, so long as such
incompetent or minor has no curator or tutor as the case may
be."
This Section, however, appears to have been enacted for the
protection of the rights of minor or incompetent claimants with
respect to the exercise of elections made available to them in that
capacity after their rights under the Act have accrued. The applica-
tion of this Section to the election to accept or reject the Act is
certain to produce anomalous results such as were suggested in the
Boihrgeois case. 4 The election to accept or reject is vested solely in
the employee, or, if he is a minor under eighteen, in his parent. The
claimant, as such, has no interest in it, and the fact that he is a minor
or is incompetent is wholly immaterial.
94. Bourgeois v. J. W. Crawford Constr. Co., 28 So. (2d) 765, 767 (La.
App. 1st cir. 1947):
"Section 16 of the act refers particularly to two classes of people in their
relation to the compensation law. The first class embodies an employee who is
either mentally incompetent, or a minor, and the second class, to mentally
incompetent or minor dependents of a minor employee whose injury resulted in
death. Nowhere do we find anything in that section which would justify applying
its provisions to a dependent parent who, like the plaintiff in this case, is mentally
competent.
"Let us take the first class emboffied in the provision of the section. That
would include an injured employee who is mentally and legally incompetent to
have made the election for himself or a minor who did not have the legal capacity
to make the election. It is contemplated that when either of those two classes
of employees survive the inijury and the demand for compensation has not
accrued to anyone else, then in presenting the claim for compensation on their
behalf the duly qualified curator or tutor, as the case may be, may exercise such
right as he may have under the act, including that of election to come under its
provisions, regardless of the time when such erection should have been made.
"Now let us take the other situation which may arise 'under that section of
the act and analyze it: To us it means that when either an injured employee who
is mentally incompetent or a minor is injured, and death results and a claim
for compensation accrues to any dependent as defined under the act, and such
dependent is mentally incompetent or a minor, at the time any right under the
act accrues, including the right of election, then the duly qualified curator or
tutor of such dependent, as the case may be, may claim and exercise any rights
under the act including that of election, regardless of the time when such election
should have been made. Under no circumstances presented in that section however
can a dependent who is mentally competent, such as the plaintiff in this case,
claim any right under the act without regard to any limitations of time therein
provided for."
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